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We test for pure contagion effects in international banking arising from the failure of the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), one of the largest bank failures in the
world. We focused on large individual banks in three developed countries where BCCI
had established operations, namely the UK, the US, and Canada. Using event study
methodology, we tested for contagion effects using time windows surrounding several
known BCCI-related announcements. Our analysis provides strong evidence of pure
contagion effects in the UK, which have arisen prior to the official closure date. In contrast,
there is no evidence of pure contagion effects in the US and Canada.
JEL classification codes: G21, G28
Key words: bank failures, pure contagion effects, event study methodology,
abnormal returns
I. Introduction
The failure of a large bank can undermine public confidence in the banking
system as a whole, which may in turn threaten the stability of the financial
system by causing runs on other banks. Such runs may be reflected in the
form of negative abnormal returns or higher volatility of the stock returns of
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the banks concerned, known as ‘contagion’ effects. Benston (1973), and
Aharony and Swary (1983) suggest two major causes for bank failures, namely
fraud and internal irregularities that are unrelated across banks, and losses
due to risky loans and investments. Contagion effects arising from a bank
failure caused by fraud and internal irregularities are known as ‘pure’ contagion
effects.
BCCI’s failure was due to massive fraud,1 and is one of the largest bank
failures that have taken place worldwide. BCCI was ranked the 7th largest
private bank, the 83rd largest in Europe and the 192nd worldwide, with total
assets which amounted to $20billion located in more than 400 offices in 73
countries (The Banker, September 1991, page 12). It was the largest bank
registered in Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands. It traded internationally
through companies registered in these two countries, each of which was audited
by different accountants. The BCCI group was managed from its headquarters
in London.2 At the end of 1986, the Capital Intelligence of Switzerland rated
it as ‘Beta’. Anecdotal evidence of contagion effects due to the BCCI’s collapse
appeared in several financial press reports. For instance, according to a
Financial Times article (24/7/91), the ‘…ripple effect from the BCCI closure
washed over National Homes Loans whose shares fell from 69p to 38p’.3 As
BCCI was a multinational bank, the repercussions of its failure were truly
international in scope. With branches and subsidiaries being located in many
countries, the regulation and supervision of its activities were undertaken by
different national supervisory bodies across countries. Communication and
1 Hall (1991).
2 On 5 July 1991, the BCCI group comprised: 1. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A.
(BCCI Holdings) incorporated in Luxembourg, the holding company of the group. 2. BCCI
S.A., one of the principal operating subsidiaries of BCCI Holdings, with 47 branches
located in 15 countries. 3. BCCI (Overseas) Ltd. (BCCI Overseas), the other principal
operating subsidiary of BCCI Holdings, with 63 branches located in 28 countries. 4. Other
affiliates and subsidiaries of BCCI Holdings, which operated 255 banking offices in about
30 countries, including Credit and Finance Corporation. ICIC Overseas and ICIC Holdings
were companies incorporated in the Cayman Islands. They were not subsidiaries of BCCI
Holdings but had a close working relationship with the BCCI group.
3 Also, the Observer (28/7/91) reported that shares of three banks fell significantly after
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action coordination of the home supervisor with other supervisors may affect
the effectiveness in preventing contagion effects arising from the failure of a
multinational bank.
The paper focuses on three developed economies where BCCI had
established operations, namely the US, the UK and Canada. The analysis
considers the three largest individual banks in each country, and examines
whether there are pure contagion effects using event study methodology,
namely considering time windows surrounding known BCCI-related events
and announcements. Although the closure of BCCI was announced on 5 July
1991, earlier events might well have signaled that the closure was imminent,
causing negative abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) to arise prior to the closure date. We identify such earlier events and
test for contagion effects, which might have arisen at these earlier dates. We
have found strong evidence of pure contagion effects in the UK and no
evidence in the US and Canada. Importantly, for the US and the Canadian
banks, there is no evidence of contagion effects either in terms of negative
ARs and CARs or in terms of volatility increase. The contagion effects in the
UK have arisen prior to the closure date, following a BCCI-related
announcement in October 1990, which suggested fraud of a large scale in the
bank’s operations. Capital markets in the UK appear to have reacted negatively
to this announcement, fully impounding this information into all three UK
banks’ share prices. Our UK results are in line with the Bingham Report
commissioned in the UK following BCCI’s closure, which raised several issues
regarding the supervision of BCCI in the UK. The event of the closure on 5
July 1991 does not appear to convey new information about BCCI. The lack
of contagion effects in the US and Canada suggests that the regulatory
measures in these countries are sufficient to prevent contagion effects arising
from the failure of a dishonestly run bank, even a large one. Our results should
be of interest to the international banking community given the increasing
emphasis on coordination of regulatory policy at an international level. Similar
analysis could be useful regarding events after BCCI’s failure, including the
collapse of Baring’s Bank in 1995 as well as the collapse of several Japanese
banks.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines the
theory and empirical evidence on contagion effects and pure contagion effects.104 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Section III outlines the data and the model specification. Section IV discusses
the empirical findings. Finally, section V concludes.
II. Bank Failures and Contagion Effects: Theory and Empirical
Evidence
Contagion effects arise due to the heterogeneity of bank assets. Banks
assets have unique characteristics, so monitoring of these assets by depositors
may be expensive. When a bank encounters financial difficulties, depositors
find it easier to withdraw their funds completely from the banking system,
rather than investigate whether the problems faced by one bank are common
to other banks as well. Consequently, if one bank fails, the others can be
affected rapidly and perhaps severely. In efficient capital markets, the spillover
effect will be reflected in negative abnormal returns generated by adverse
movements in the price of stock in all banks in the sector.4 The negative
stock returns experienced by other banks are known as contagion effects. In
terms of the origins of contagion effects, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
demonstrate that contagion effects can develop from random shocks that induce
some depositors to withdraw funds, even when no fundamental change in a
bank’s prospects has occurred. Depositor perceptions about the ability of a
given bank to meet its obligations affect expectations about the condition of
the banking sector as a whole.5 Contagion effects arising from a bank failure
caused by fraud and internal irregularities are known as ‘pure’ contagion
effects. The pure contagion effects hypothesis does not examine contagion
effects arising from failure due to activities that are not unique to the bank in
question, such as risky lending or investment policies.
To prevent contagion effects, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Chan et
al. (1992) argue in favor of stronger government regulation to protect
4 This study assumes that capital markets are efficient. Murphy (1979) and Pettway and
Sinkey (1980) have found evidence in support of the efficiency of markets for actively
traded bank securities.
5 Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) address the question of what triggers a bank run by
explicitly modelling interim information about the bank’s investment in risky assets. The
authors show that the welfare consequences of such behavior have important implications
for the choice between nontraded deposits contracts and traded equity contracts.105 PURE CONTAGION EFFECTS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
depositors and counteract perverse incentives at distressed banks in which
uninformed investors hold deposits. Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS), capital
requirements and supervision are the standard regulatory mechanisms. Dothan
and Williams (1980) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991) take a different line by
arguing that the holders of claims against banks are the most effective monitors
of banks’ activities. Furthermore, Flannery (1995) argues that regulation to
mitigate contagion effects may be inefficient and counterproductive.
Empirical studies on contagion effects have focused mainly on US bank
failures. Aharony and Swary (1983) focus on the failure of FNB in 1974 and
find evidence of contagion effects. Lamy and Thompson (1986), and Peavy
and Hempel (1988) examine contagion effects caused by Penn Square’s failure,
with mixed results. Swary (1986) examines the Continental Illinois’ failure
and finds evidence of significant contagion effects. Furfine (1999) explores
the likely contagious impact of a significant bank failure using data on credit
exposures arising from overnight federal funds transactions. Using these
exposures to simulate the impact of various failure scenarios, Furfine (1999)
found that the risk of contagion is economically small. Dickinson et al. (1991)
fail to find evidence of contagion effects arising from the failure of First
Republic Bank. Finally, Saunders and Wilson (1996) found evidence of
contagion for the 1930-1932 period, by analyzing the behavior of deposit
flows in a sample of failed and healthy banks. Empirical studies on pure
contagion effects are rather limited. Aharony and Swary (1983) focus on the
failure of two US banks, namely USNB in 1973 and HNB in 1976, and fail to
find evidence of pure contagion effects. Jayanti et al. (1996) focus on the
failure of two Canadian banks, namely the Canadian Commercial Bank (CCK)
and Northland Bank (NB), as well as on the failure of the British bank Johnson
Matthey Bankers (JMB) Limited. Their results indicate that there is some
evidence of pure contagion effects in Canada, but no evidence of such effects
in the UK. There are, however, several characteristics, which differentiate
CCK, NB, and JMB from BCCI. First, CCK, NB, and JMB were relatively
small banks compared to BCCI. Second, the BCCI was a multinational bank,
whereas CCK, NB and JMB did not have any international banking operations.
Third, BCCI posed particular supervisory problems because the two companies
through which it carried out its international business were registered in
Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands, its principal shareholders were latterly106 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS




We consider the banking sectors of three developed economies where
BCCI had established banking operations, namely the US, the UK and
Canada.6 For each of these three countries, we consider the three largest
individual banks or banking institutions in terms of assets size.7 The sample
of banks includes Barclays, National Westminster (Nat West), and Midland
for the UK; Citicorp, Bank of America, and Chase Manhattan for the US; and
the Royal Bank, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, and the Bank of
6 We could have also added Japan in our sample. However, it was decided for Japan to be
ruled out because there were several reports regarding banking scandals, which appeared
around the same dates as the dates of the BCCI-related events outlined in the previous
section. Several major Japanese banks were involved in these reports. On 8 October 1990
(two days prior to the first BCCI-related event considered in this study), the chairman of
Sumitomo, Japan’s most profitable commercial bank, resigned over a stock market scandal
(The Times, 8 October 1990, Section: Business). On 12 October 1990, it was reported that
another Japanese major bank, Sanwa, was ‘linked to scandal’ (The Independent, 12 October
1990, Section: Business and City Page, page 22). Both Sanwa and Sumitomo were among
the three largest Japanese banks at that time. On 15 October 1990, there are further reports
regarding banking scandals in Japan involving several major banks (The Guardian, 15
October 1990, ‘Japanese banking scandal could extend’). On 3 March 1991 (one day prior
to the second BCCI-related event of 4 March 1991), there were reports that several major
Japanese banks ‘…offered several hundreds billion yen in loans’ to a speculative stock
investment house, whose chief was arrested on 3 March 1991 (The Daily Yomiuri, 3 March
1991, page 6).  On 6 July 1991 (one day after the official closure of BCCI), there were
further reports of scandals in Japanese banking involving major banks (The Nikkei Weekly,
‘Securities scandal reveals cancer in Japan’s economy,’ page 6). These reports may be
considered as confounding events with regard to the effects which could potentially arise
from the BCCI-related reports, as it is unclear whether possible negative stock returns in
the Japanese banking sector are attributed to the BCCI-related events or to the events
discussed above.
7 The list of the largest banks at the time of BCCI’s closure, which we used to choose the
individual banks, is published at The Banker (July 1991), ‘Top 1000 Banks by country.’107 PURE CONTAGION EFFECTS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
Montreal for Canada. Daily stock price data for all banks were obtained from
Datastream, and span the period from 1 January 1989 to 31 December 1991.8
For each country, we also consider the market stock index constructed by
Datastream. Stock returns are computed as the first difference of the natural
logarithm of two consecutive daily stock prices. All stock return series have
been confirmed as stationary processes using the augmented Dickey-Fuller
test.9
B. Model Specification
To test for contagion effects, i.e. negative abnormal returns and negative
cumulative abnormal returns for each bank in each country, we employ event
study methodology based on the market model (Smirlock and Kaufold,
1987).10 In order to specify an empirical model, it is necessary to investigate
which of the events prior to BCCI’s closure seem most likely to have affected
other banks’ stock returns. Although the closure of BCCI was announced on
5 July 1991, earlier events might well have signaled that the closure was
imminent, causing negative abnormal returns prior to this date. Although BCCI
made several announcements in May and June 1990 of significant losses and
job cuts, it was not until 10 October 1990 that the first Price Waterhouse
report was published raising suspicions of fraud. As the cause of BCCI’s
collapse was fraud and 10 October 1990 was the first date when an official
report was published raising suspicions of fraud, we consider this date as the
first candidate event date. A second candidate date is 4 March 1991, when
the Bank of England, aware that significant accounting transactions ‘…may
have been either false or deceitful,’ appointed Price Waterhouse to investigate
8 Masulis (1980) points out the advantage of using daily data rather than weekly or monthly
data.
9 Unit root test results are not reported to save space, but are available upon request.
10 Event study methodology is used extensively in corporate finance, to investigate the
stock price effects of firms’ financing decisions. The extensive use of event study
methodology can be in part attributed to its implicit acceptance by the US Supreme Court
in determining materiality in insider trading cases, and for determining appropriate
disgorgement amounts in cases of fraud.108 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
11 The Banker, September 1991, pages 12-13.
these allegations.11A third candidate date is 21 June 1991, when the Price
Waterhouse report to the Bank of England was published, documenting
evidence of large-scale fraud over several years. The fourth candidate date is
5 July 1991, the date of closure.
For each candidate event date k (k = 10 October 1990, 4 March 1991, 21
June 1991, and 5 July 1991), we define a 7-day event window starting 3
trading days prior to the event (day k-3) and ending 3 trading days after the
event (day k + 3). For each of the 7 trading days within each event window,
we define a dummy variable Dk,j for j = -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3,  taking a value
of 1 on day j, and 0 elsewhere. For each event date k and bank return series i,
the following model is specified:
where:
Ri,t is the continuously compounded daily return of bank i on day t (expressed
in percentage form).
ai is the constant term for bank i.
Mt is the continuously compounded return on the market index corresponding
to day t (expressed in percentage form).
b1i is the response of bank i’s return to the current market return.
b2i is the response of bank i’s return to the lagged market return.
Dk,j for j = -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3 are the event window dummy variables for
candidate event date k.
di,k,j is bank i’s abnormal return j days before/after event date k.
e i,t is the stochastic error term for bank i on day t.
The inclusion of the market return (Mt) controls for movements in the
returns of bank i, which are attributable to fluctuations in the corresponding
market stock price index. Following Saunders and Smirlock (1987), and
Madura et al. (1992), the lagged market return (Mt-1) is also included, to correct
for no synchronous trading. The event window dummies capture the unique
(abnormal) response of each bank’s returns on the days immediately
surrounding the event (Smirlock and Kaufold, 1987).
3
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Given that for each country we consider three banks, a system of three
equations is estimated for each country for each candidate event date,
containing one separate version of equation (1) for each bank. The system
can be written in matrix form as follows:
R = C + Mb + Dd d d d d + U                                                  (2)
where:
R is a T x 3 matrix for the returns of the three banks in each country. T is the
sample size.
C is a T x 3 matrix of constants.
M is a T x 2 matrix containing the market index returns and the lagged market
index returns.
b is a 2 x 3 matrix of coefficients to be estimated.
D is a T x 7 matrix containing the 7 dummy variables for each candidate
event date.
d d d d d is a 7 x 3 matrix of coefficients to be estimated.
U is the error terms matrix.
We follow Madura et al. (1992), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987), Slovin
and Jayanti (1993), and Jayanti et al. (1996) in using the Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR) method (Zellner, 1962) to estimate the system in (2). The
SUR method has the advantage of taking account of the heteroscedasticity
and cross-correlation of errors across equations of the system, and results in
more efficient estimates than ordinary least squares (Jayanti et al., 1996).
Testing for statistically significant abnormal returns (AR) for bank i, j
days before/after event date k, is equivalent to testing for the significance of
parameters di,k,j on the basis of a t-test. To test for statistically significant
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bank i over specific day intervals,
we focus on each equation of the estimated system. Consider equation (1)
that corresponds to bank i. For instance, to test for statistically significant
CARs for bank i over the day interval (-2, +2), i.e. from 2 trading days prior
to the event until 2 trading days after the event, we test for the following
hypothesis:110 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
H0: di,k-2 + di,k-1 + di,k + di,k+1 + di,k+2 = 0                       (3)
The Wald statistics for this hypothesis are distributed as c2 with n-degrees
of freedom, where n is the number of restrictions under the null hypothesis.
In our case, n = 1. A similar procedure is employed for other day intervals.
The magnitude of the CARs is simply the sum of the estimated coefficients of
the corresponding dummies. In the example, the CARs over the day interval
(-2, +2) equal  ,2 ˆ
ik d - +         +  , ˆ
ik d +          +  ,2 ˆ. ik d +
IV. Empirical Findings
The empirical results for the UK banks are reported in Tables 1 and 2, for
the US banks in Tables 3 and 4, and for the Canadian banks in Tables 5 and 6.
Tables 1 and 2 report the UK results for abnormal returns and cumulative
abnormal returns, respectively.12 As shown in Table 1, statistically significant
(at the 5% level) negative abnormal returns exist for all three banks for the
event on 10 October 1990, the date of publication of the initial Price
Waterhouse report outlining suspicions of large scale fraud in BCCI’s
operations.
Importantly, for all three banks, the statistically significant (at the 5% level)
negative abnormal returns arose on day k, that is, on the date of the event. The
daily abnormal returns on that day were –4.0% (for Nat West and Midland) and
–2.8% (for Barclays). Furthermore, as shown in Table 2, there is evidence of
statistically significant (at the 5% level) negative CARs for all three banks for
the event on 10 October 1990 over the interval (0, +2), and some evidence of
statistically significant negative CARs over the day intervals (-1, 0) and (-2, +2).
There is no evidence of statistically significant (at the 5% level) negative
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the other event dates. These
results suggest that the UK market appears to have responded to the news of
the report on 10 October 1990, fully impounding this information into British
,1 ˆ
ik d - ,1 ˆ
ik d +
12 To save space, Table 1, 3 and 5 report the coefficients of the event date dummies for
those dates for which there were significant. Though not reported, the market index estimated
coefficient is significant at 1% for any event date (i.e., 10 October 1990, 4 March 1991, 21
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Table 1. UK  Banks: Abnormal Returns
Barclays Nat West Midland
10 October 10 October 10 October
1990 1990 1990
Constant -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 - 0.001 -0.001
(0.32) (-0.75) (-0.90) (-1.36) (-1.52)
Market index 1.28 *** 1.43 *** 1.44 *** 1.34 *** 1.39 ***
(24.83) (23.28) (23.73) (17.93) (18.78)
Lagged market 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.08
index (0.87) (-0.31) (0.19) (-1.27) (-1.10)
k - 3 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.79) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03)
k - 2 0.01 -0.001 0.004 0.026 0.03 *
(1.02) (-0.07) (0.29) (1.57) (1.94)
k - 1 -0.001 -0.005 0.01 -0.03 * 0.02
(-0.17) (-0.41) (0.61) (-1.75) (1.39)
k -0.028 ** -0.04 *** -0.03 * -0.04 ** -0.03
(-2.57) (-3.08) (-1.73) (-2.48) (-1.48)
k + 1 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.002 -0.02
(-0.82) (-1.48) (-1.60) (-0.13) (-1.19)
k + 2 -0.01 -0.005 0.003 -0.03 -0.01
(-1.02) (-0.39) (0.23) (-1.58) (-0.60)
k + 3 0.01 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.006
(0.30) (-0.24) (0.12) (-0.10) (-0.19)
DW 1.83 1.91 1.90 1.86 1.85
R2 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.32 0.32
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics in the parentheses. *, **, *** denotes statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%  level respectively. DW denotes the Durbin-Watson
statistic.
banks’ share prices. The later events, including that of the official closure,
appear to be of no importance in terms of market reaction. Overall, there is
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Table 2. UK Banks: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
10 October 1990 5 July 1991
Barclays Nat West Midland Barclays Nat West Midland
(-1, 0) 3.24 * 6.13 ** 9.10 *** 0.29 0.33 0.46
[0.07] [0.013] [0.00] [0.59] [0.56] [0.49]
(+1, +2) 1.70 1.75 1.48 1.10 0.82 0.87
[0.20] [0.18] [0.22] [0.30] [0.36] [0.35]
(0, +2) 5.89 ** 8.14 *** 5.87 ** 1.68 3.50 * 2.25
[0.015] [0.00] [0.015] [0.20] [0.06] [0.13]
(-2, +2) 2.26 5.97 ** 3.88 ** 0.0001 0.64 0.64
[0.13] [0.014] [0.048] [0.99] [0.42] [0.42]
Notes: The table entries are Wald statistics for testing the hypothesis that the CARs at the
respective day interval are equal to zero against the alternative that they are negative. The
Wald statistics are distributed as a c2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The 5% critical
value is 3.84.  Marginal significance levels of the Wald statistics are reported in squared
brackets. *, **, *** denote statistically significant (different from zero) CARs at the 10%, 5%,
and 1%  level of statistical significance.
the publication of the initial Price Waterhouse report on 10 October 1990.13 Our
results for the UK differ from those of Jayanti et al. (1996), who failed to find
evidence of contagion effects in the UK following the failure of Johnson
Matthey Bankers (JMB). This discrepancy may be attributed to the relatively
large size of BCCI in comparison with JMB, whose size was not exceeding
US$1 billion. Evidence by Aharony and Swary (1996), and Akhibe and Madura
(2001) has indicated that the magnitude of contagion effects is positively related
to the size of the failed bank. Furthermore, in contrast to JMB, BCCI was a large
bank owning several other smaller banks. Akhibe and Madura (2001) have
shown that the degree of contagion effects is stronger when the failed bank owns
multiple banks and subsidiaries.
13 We have checked whether there have been other events on 10 October 1990, related
specifically to Nat West, Barclays and Midland, by searching the Financial Times for the
period around 10 October 1990. We found that there is no other event or news related to
these three banks to justify the negative returns in that time interval.113 PURE CONTAGION EFFECTS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
Table 3. US  Banks: Abnormal Returns
Citicorp           Bank of America            Chase Manhattan
10 October 10 October 5 July 10 October 21 June
1990 1990 1991 1990 1991
Constant -0.002 *** -0.005 -0.0001 -0.001 * -0.001 *
(-2.65) (-0.06) (-0.14) (-1.83) (-1.65)
Market index 1.51 *** 1.45 *** 1.470 *** 1.29 *** 1.29 ***
(17.06) (18.68) (19.18) (15.68) (15.76)
Lagged market -0.13 0.25 *** 0.23 *** -0.03 -0.04
index (-1.38) (3.11) (3.03) (-0.26) (-0.48)
k - 3 0.01 -0.01 0.012 0.007 -0.003
(0.32) (-0.120) (0.98) (0.51) (-0.54)
k - 2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
(-0.38) (-0.44) (-1.25) (-0.79) (-0.30)
k - 1 0.04 ** -0.03 * 0.01 0.03 * -0.03
(2.04) (-1.72) (0.14) (1.78) (-1.27)
k 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.001 -0.01
(1.04) (-0.20) (1.46) (0.04) (-0.32)
k + 1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02
(-0.57) (-0.04) (-1.37) (-0.42) (0.90)
k + 2 -0.02 0.010 0.04 ** 0.02 -0.04 *
(-1.02) (0.55) (2.02) (1.06) (-1.82)
k + 3 0.04 -0.001 -0.012 -0.015 -0.01
(0.21) (-0.30) (-0.21) (-0.09) (-0.22)
DW 1.96 1.78 1.77 1.70 1.71
R2 0.25 0.33 0.34 0.24 0.25
Note: See notes in Table 1.
We next turn to the results for the US banks. There is no evidence of
statistically significant (at the 5% level) negative abnormal returns for any
of the three US banks at any of the four event dates, thereby indicating that
there are no contagion effects in the form of negative abnormal returns (see114 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 3). To explore if contagion effects in the three US banks stock returns
might have arisen in the form of higher volatility around each of the four
events dates, instead of negative abnormal returns, we estimated an
EGARCH(1,1) model for the conditional volatility of each of the three banks
returns.14 This model was estimated for each of the four event dates by
including the 7 dummy variables as exogenous variables in the conditional
variance equation.15 The results for the four event dates were all very similar
and thus, we only report the results for the event of the 10th October 1990,
the event for which contagion effects were found in the UK. These results
are reported in Table 4. As shown in this table, all of the 7 dummy variables
in the conditional variance equation are statistically insignificant, suggesting
that the event of the 10th October 1990 did not cause an increase in the
volatility of each of the three US banks. Similar conclusions can be drawn
from the results for the other event dates, which were similar to the results
for the 10th October 1990. These findings indicate that there are no contagion
effects even in terms of the volatility of stock returns of the US banks.16
14 We preferred an EGARCH to a GARCH model, as the EGARCH captures the well
known asymmetric effect in the volatility of stock returns. Also, previous studies (Engle
and Ng, 1993; Nelson, 1991) have shown that the EGARCH model performs better than
other asymmetric models of the GARCH family.
15 A similar approach has been followed by Bomfim (2003).
16 Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we have also estimated EGARCH-
in-Mean models. By en large, the empirical results were qualitative similar to those reported
here.
Table 4. US banks: Testing for Contagion Effects in Terms of Volatility
of  Stock Returns (Event: 10 October 1990)
Parameter Citicorp Bank of America Chase Manhattan
a0 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.98) (0.25) (1.50)
a1 0.05 0.21 *** 0.06 *
(1.51) (5.65) (1.65)
a2 -0.06 * -0.03 0.05 *
(-1.85) (-0.97) (1.80)115 PURE CONTAGION EFFECTS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
52 63 } tt dD dD + + + +
a 3 0.003 -0.02 -0.02
(0.09) (-0.70) (-0.80)
b0 -7.74 *** -7.72 *** -7.20 ***
(-3.93) (-11.17) (-11.80)
b1 0.12 ** 0.40 *** 0.64 ***
(2.14) (6.19) (11.00)
b2 -0.14 *** -0.09 * 0.11
(-3.49) (-1.92) (1.30)
d0 -1.09 0.01 0.03
(-0.01) (0.10) (0.01)
d1 0.46 0.02 -0.12
(0.01) (0.03) (-0.50)
d2 0.32 -0.01 -0.77
(0.02) (-0.17) (-0.45)
d3 -0.08 -0.02 -0.15
(-0.10) (-0.18) (-0.60)
d4 -0.03 0.08 0.10
(-0.10) (0.01) (0.85)
d5 0.02 0.07 0.03
(0.32) (0.02) (0.75)
d6 -0.01 0.03 0.02
(-0.20) (0.03) (0.10)
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
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Table 4. (Continued) US banks: Testing for Contagion Effects in Terms
of Volatility of  Stock Returns (Event: 10 October 1990)
Parameter Citicorp Bank of America Chase Manhattan
() [ | | | | ] tt t t gz z z Ez q = + -
where Rt is each bank’s stock returns, e t is the error, W t-1 is the  information set at (t-1),
2
t s is the time varying variance, zt  is the standardized residual (e t /st), Dt is the event
dummy for the 10th October 1990, Dt-i, i = 1, 2, 3, are the dummies for each of the three
days prior to the event, and Dt+i, i = 1, 2, 3 are the dummies for each of the three days
following the event. Statistical inference is based on robust t-statistics (Bollerslev and
Wooldridge, 1992).116 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
These results indicate that there is no evidence of pure contagion effects
in the US banking sector due to BCCI’s failure, and are in line with the findings
of Aharony and Swary (1983), who failed to find evidence of pure contagion
effects in the US following the collapse of USND of San Diego. The lack of
contagion effects in the US can be attributed to several factors. One such
factor is the relatively large size of the US deposit insurance coverage, and
the perception that even uninsured depositors will not lose in the case of a
bank failure. In the US, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
insures deposits up to a maximum of US$ 100,000 per depositor per bank,
while in the UK the maximum amount insured is Pound Sterling 10,000 per
depositor per institution. According to Jayanti et al. (1996), the market’s
perception of the extent to which uninsured depositors are likely to suffer
losses may significantly influence the market reaction. The extent of losses to
bank creditors depends on the speed and method employed by regulators to
resolve bank failures. In the US, when regulators adopted the pay-off method,
uninsured depositors received 90 per cent of their deposits. Also, in the wake
of the Continental Illinois crisis in 1984, US bank regulators adopted the ‘too
big to fail doctrine’ and paid off both insured and uninsured depositors (Jayanti
et al., 1996). Another factor is the relatively large distance of BCCI’s
headquarters, located in London, from the headquarters of the US banks.
Evidence by Aharony and Swary (1996) has indicated that the smaller the
distance of a solvent bank’s headquarters from the headquarters of a large
failing bank, the weaker will be the negative impact on the solvent bank’s
stock returns.
Results for the abnormal returns for the Canadian banks are reported in
Table 5. We found no evidence of statistically significant negative abnormal
returns for any of the three banks at any candidate event date. Similarly, there
is no evidence of statistically significant negative CARs.17 In order to explore
if there are contagion effects in terms of higher volatility of returns, we also
estimated an EGARCH(1,1) model for each of the three Canadian banks. For
each event date, we estimated an EGARCH(1,1) model by including the 7
event dummy variables as exogenous variables in the conditional variance
equation. The results for the event of the 10th October 1990 are reported in
17 The results on CARs are not reported here to save space, but are available on request.117 PURE CONTAGION EFFECTS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
Table 5.  Canadian  Banks: Abnormal Returns
Canadian
 Imperial Bank Royal Bank of Canada
of Commerce
10 October  10 October 10 October 4 March 5 July
1990 1990 1990 1991 1991
Constant 0.001 0.0004 * 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
(1.06) (1.79) (1.63) (1.54) (1.51)
Market index 1.39 *** 0.98 *** 1.18 *** 1.19 *** 1.19 ***
(24.75) (18.95) (22.76) (22.99) (23.11)
Lagged market 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
index (0.549) (0.71) (-0.22) (-0.48) (-0.33)
k - 3 0.012 0.006 -0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.40) (0.02) (-0.03) (0.51) (0.21)
k - 2 -0.01 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.02 * -0.0003
(-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.06) (1.94) (-0.04)
k - 1 0.02 ** 0.01 -0.002 -0.01 0.01 *
(2.20) (1.07) (-0.32) (-1.22) (1.74)
k 0.01 0.01 * -0.01 -0.001 0.01
(0.85) (1.83) (-0.87) (-0.12) (0.75)
k + 1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.002
(-1.61) (-0.19) (-1.45) (0.76) (-0.35)
k + 2 0.026 *** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.001 0.001
(3.21) (1.58) (1.99) (0.19) (0.21)
k + 3 0.007 0.01 0.003 -0.001 0.001
(0.02) (0.15) (0.14) (-0.08) (0.11)
DW 1.84 1.64 1.81 1.80 1.82
R2 0.47 0.34 0.42 0.42 0.42
Note: See notes in Table 1.
Table 6. The results for the other three events are qualitatively similar to
those for the 10th October 1990. As shown in this table, no one of the 7 dummy
Bank of
Montreal118 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 6. Canadian Banks: Testing for Contagion Effects in Terms of
the Volatility of Stock Returns (Event: 10 October 1990)
Canadian Imperial Royal Bank
Bank of Commerce of  Canada
a0 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.21) (0.60) (1.08)
a1 0.15 *** 0.21 *** 0.17 ***
(3.77) (5.75) (4.44)
a2 0.07 ** 0.04 0.07 **
(2.21) (1.25) (2.10)
a3 0.001 -0.04 -0.02
(0.03) (-1.30) (-0.53)
b0 -9.15 *** -9.40 -9.23 ***
(-4.45) (-1.19) (-3.90)
b1 0.37 *** 0.05 0.23 ***
(5.51) (0.82) (3.27)
b2 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.17) (0.69) (0.29)
d0 -0.07 -0.09 0.03
(-0.10) (-0.05) (0.10)
d1 -0.50 -0.01 0.07
(-0.40) (-0.38) (0.01)
d2 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03
(-0.19) (-0.09) (-0.04)
d3 -0.60 -0.02 0.07
(-0.03) (-0.04) (0.50)
d4 0.02 0.015 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.25)
d5 0.02 0.08 0.01
(0.01) (0.30) (0.08)
d6 -0.01 0.08 -0.01
(-0.01) (0.20) (-0.99)
Note: See notes in Table 4.
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variables is statistically significant, thereby suggesting that the event of the
10th October 1990 did not cause a volatility increase in the stock returns of
each of the three Canadian banks. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the
other three events. Therefore, there is no evidence of contagion effects for
the Canadian banks even in terms of volatility.
These results are in contrast to the findings of Jayanti et al. (1996), who
found some evidence of negative abnormal returns and negative cumulative
abnormal returns on the Canadian banking sector following the collapse of
two domestic banks, namely the Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB) and the
Northbank. This differing reaction may be accounted for by the fact that CCB
and Northbank were relatively larger banks in Canada than BCCI-Canada,
and by the large distance of BCCI’s headquarters from the headquarters of
the Canadian banks.18 According to Akhibe and Madura (2001), the smaller
the relative size of the assets of the failed bank in one country, the higher the
ability of ‘rival’ banks to withstand financial distress. In addition, the difference
of our results for Canada from those for the UK can be attributed to the
relatively higher size of the deposit insurance coverage in Canada, which is
up to US$ 52,000.19
Overall, the results for the US and Canada suggest that the failure of a
dishonestly run bank, even a large one, does not cause loss of confidence in
the integrity of the banking system as a whole. The standard regulatory
measures available, such as deposit insurance, appear to be sufficient in
protecting against contagion effects. In the UK, the existence of pure contagion
effects may be interpreted as an indication that UK capital markets were
concerned about the supervision of BCCI and the adequacy of the regulatory
system to prevent the collapse of the bank. This interpretation is in line with
the Bingham Report commissioned in the UK after BCCI’s failure. This report
raised several issues in relation to the supervision of BCCI in the UK, and
offered a number of detailed suggestions to strengthen it, including the need
for greater cooperation, greater sharing of information, strengthening of
18 CCB and Northbank were ranked 10th and 11th in Canada; BCCI-Canada was at a much
lower rank.
19 The Banker, 1 September 1991, ‘BCCI: How safe is your money?’, vol. 141, no 787.120 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
internal communications, and more efficient supervision of internationally
spread banking groups like BCCI.20
V. Conclusions
This study has examined the issue of contagion effects in international
banking arising from the failure of BCCI, one of the largest multinational
banks. As the failure of BCCI was due to fraud, this study offers an empirical
assessment of the ‘pure’ contagion effects hypothesis. We focused on the
three largest banks in three developed countries where BCCI had established
operations, namely the UK, the US, and Canada. Using event study
methodology, we tested for negative abnormal returns and negative cumulative
abnormal returns on individual banks surrounding several BCCI-related
announcements. Our analysis provides strong evidence of pure contagion
effects in the UK which have arisen prior to the official closure date, following
a BCCI-related announcement raising suspicions of irregularities and fraud
on a large scale in the bank’s operations. Our results suggest that stock prices
of all three UK banks reacted negatively to information about fraud in a large
bank’s activities. There is no evidence of pure contagion effects in the US
and Canada, even in terms of the volatility of bank stock returns, which
suggests that the regulatory measures available in these two countries appear
to be sufficient in preventing contagion effects arising from the failure of a
large bank with fraudulent activities. Our results for the UK are in line with
the Bingham Report, which offered several recommendations to strengthen
the supervision of internationally spread groups like BCCI.
20 Further recommendations included the establishment of a trained and qualified special
investigations unit to consider all warnings of malpractice, strengthening of the Bank of
England’s legal unit, and strengthening of the Bank’s powers to refuse authorisation on the
grounds that a bank cannot be effectively supervised. (Financial Times, 23 October 1992,
‘Bingham report – Investigation into the BCCI scandal: The main recommendations’, page
8). In response to this report, several measures were announced to strengthen the supervision
in the future. (Financial Times, 23 October 1992, ‘Bingham report – Investigation into the
BCCI scandal: Governor outlines stronger measures’, page 8).121 PURE CONTAGION EFFECTS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
References
Aharony, Joseph, and Itzhak Swary (1983), “Contagion Effects of Bank
Failures: Evidence from Capital Markets,” Journal of Business 56: 305-322.
Aharony, Joseph, and Itzhak Swary (1996), “Additional Evidence on the
Information-based Contagion Effects of Bank Failures,” Journal of
Banking and Finance 20: 57-69.
Akhibe, Aigbe, and Jeff Madura (2001), “Why do Contagion Effects Vary
among Bank Failures?”, Journal of Banking and Finance 25: 657-680.
Benston, George (1973), “Bank Examination,” Bulletin of Institute of Finance,
May: 89-90.
Bollerslev, Tim, and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge (1992), “Quasi-maximum
Likelihood Estimation and Inference in Dynamic Models with Time-
varying Covariances,” Econometric Reviews 11: 143-155.
Bomfim, Antulio (2003), “Pre-announcement Effects, News Effects and
Volatility: Monetary Policy and the Stock Market,” Journal of Banking
and Finance 27: 133-151.
Calomiris, Charles, and Charles Kahn (1991), “The Role of Demandable Debt
in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements,” American Economic
Review 81:  497-513.
Chan, Yuk-Shee, Stuart Greenbaum, and Anjan Thakor (1992), “Is Fairly
Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?”, Journal of Finance 47: 227-246.
Diamond, Douglas, and Philip Dybvig (1983), “Deposit Insurance, Liquidity
and Bank Runs,” Journal of Political Economy 91: 401-419.
Dickinson, Amy, David Peterson, and William Christiansen (1991), “An
Empirical Investigation into the Failure of First Public Bank: Is there
Contagion?”, Financial Review 26: 303-318.
Dothan, Uri, and Joseph Williams (1980), “Banks, Bankruptcy and
Regulation,” Journal of Banking and Finance 4: 65-87.
Flannery, Mark (1995), “Prudential Regulation for Banks,” in K. Sawamoto,
Z. Nakajima and H. Taguchi, eds., Financial Stability in a Changing
Environment: 281-318, New York, St Martin’s Press.
Furfine, Craig H. (1999), “Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of
Contagion,” BIS Working Paper No 70: 1-26, Bank for International
Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, Basel, Switzerland.122 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Hall, Maximilian. (1991), “The BCCI Affair”, Banking World, September:
8-11.
Jacklin, Charles, and Sudipto Bhattacharya (1988), “Distinguishing Panics
and Information-based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications,”
Journal of Political Economy 96: 668-592.
Jayanti, Subbarao V., Ann Marie Whyte, and A. Quang Do (1996), “Bank
Failures and Contagion Effects: Evidence from Britain and Canada,”
Journal of Economics and Business 48: 103-116.
Lamy, Robert E., and G. Rodney Thompson (1986), “Penn Square, Problem
Loans, and Insolvency Risk,” Journal of Financial Research 9: 103-111.
Madura, Jeff, Alan Tucker, and Emilio Zarruk (1992), “Reaction of Bank
Share Prices to the Third-world Debt Reduction Plan,” Journal of Banking
and Finance 16: 853-868.
Masulis, Ronald W. (1980), “The Effects of Capital Structure Change on
Security Returns: A Study of Exchange Offers,” Journal of Financial
Economics 8: 139-177.
Murphy, Neil (1979), “Disclosure of the Problem Bank Lists: A Test of the
Impact,” Journal of Bank Research 10: 88-96.
Peavy, John III, and George Hempel (1988), “The Penn Square Bank Failure:
Effect on Commercial Bank Security Returns-A Note,” Journal of Banking
and Finance 12: 141-150.
Saunders, Anthony, and Michael Smirlock (1987), “Intra and Interindustry
Effects of Bank Securities Market Activities: The Case of Discount
Brokerage,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 22: 467-482.
Slovin, Myron, and Subbarao V. Jayanti (1993), “Bank Capital Regulation
and the Valuation Effects of Latin American Debt Moratoriums,” Journal
of Banking and Finance 17: 159-174.
Smirlock, Michael, and Howard Kaufold (1987), “Bank Foreign Lending,
Mandatory Disclosure Rules, and the Reaction of Bank Stock Prices to
the Mexican Debt Crisis,” Journal of Business 60: 347-364.
Swary, Itzhak (1986), “Stock Market Reaction to Regulatory Action in the
Continental Illinois Crisis,” Journal of Business 59: 451-473.
The Banker (1991), “Unanswered Questions,” September: 12-19.
The Banker (1991), “Top 1000 Banks by Country,” July: 15-25.
Zellner, Arnold (1962), “An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly123 PURE CONTAGION EFFECTS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
Unrelated Regression and Tests of Aggregate Bias,” Journal of American
Statistical Association 57: 348-368.